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Abstract: The 2007/2008 global credit crisis was born out of opaque securitization 
transactions. Introducing structured products risk estimation techniques shows how the most 
basic investment analysis could not be done without detailed and updated knowledge on the 
assets  of  the  pool.  Access  to  such  details  was  crucial  for  investors  to  perform  an 
autonomous valuation, the lack of which led to a pervading acceptance of ratings at face 
value.  The  crisis  brought  numerous  delusions  to  naïve  users  of  these  privately  issued 
opinions. Coming back to the central role that investor played during the previous speculative 
episode and introducing a theoretical discussion on the dynamics of market finance, it is 
shown  that  trusting  market  discipline  and  due  diligence  was  bound  to  end  up  being 
misguiding. Given that unprecedented rating volatility brought a share of the blame game to 
rating  firms,  strategies  that  would  aim  at  securing  an  informed  use  of  ratings  are  finally 
outlined. 
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Résumé: La crise mondiale du cr￩dit de 2007/2008 a pour origine l‟opacit￩ relative 
aux  opérations  de  titrisation.  En  expliquant  comment  mesurer  le  risque  des  produits 
structur￩s,  on  montre  que  l‟autonomie  d‟￩valuation  des  investisseurs  passe  par  une 
connaissance  précise  et  en  continu  des  éléments  du  pool  sous-jacent.  Une  forme  de 
d￩mission  sur  ce  point  a  amen￩  l‟industrie  des  notations  à  jouer  un  rôle  central  dans 
l‟interm￩diation  financi￨re  de  la  titrisation.  Ainsi,  au  cœur  de  la  crise,  la  volatilité 
historiquement  anormale  des  notes  a  eu  un  écho  sans  précédent.  En  introduisant  une 
perspective théorique sur les dynamiques de la finance de marché, on met en avant le rôle 
clé des banquiers d‟investissement dans la phase euphorique ayant précédé le retournement 
actuel et on montre que s‟en remettre à la discipline de marché était naïf voire coupable. 
Vecteur privilégié de cette discipline, la notation a reçu son lot de critiques qu‟il s‟agit de 
dépasser pour penser l‟harmonisation et la systématisation d‟une activité de contrôle après 
émission des crédits structurés: la réforme de l‟industrie de la notation est à envisager sous 
cet angle. 
 
Mots clés: crise financière, risque de crédit, agences de notation 














A major feature of the 2007/2008 credit crisis is that it began with difficulties with subprime 
mortgage structured products. These difficulties evidenced disruptions in the due diligence 
that must guide intermediaries during the origination of structured product securities. Aschraft 
&Schuerman  (2008)  identified  seven key frictions  at  the  heart  of the subprime mortgage 
securitization  process  and  outlined  the  mismanagements  that  brought  the  summer  2007 
turmoil.  The  authors  noted  that:  1/  the  basic  issues  outlined  were  valid  for  the  whole 
securitization process and 2/ the credit rating agencies played an important role in resolving 
or at least mitigating several of these frictions.  
Attempting  a  similarly  detailed  picture  of  the  disruptions  in  the  structured  finance 
intermediation chain is beyond the scope of this paper: the focus here is on the role that 
rating firms ended up playing and on how this role brings forward critical features of the 
crisis.  The  first  part  of  this  text  introduces  the  massive  downgrades  that  have  brought 
defiance against the widely shared risk measures known as ratings. How is it that these 
downgrades  came  to  matter  that  much?  Introducing  structured  products  risk  estimation 
techniques  shows  that  the  most  basic  analysis  could  not  be  done  without  detailed  and 
updated  knowledge  on  the  assets  of  the  pool.  Access  to  such  details  was  crucial  for 
investors  to  perform  an  autonomous  valuation,  the  lack  of  which  led  to  a  pervading 
acceptance  of  ratings  at  face  value.  This  leads  to  outline  two  major  issues:  (i)  once 
structured products were issued, rating agencies did not provide the monitoring information 
that was critical for investors to use their ratings in an informed manner and (ii) internal risk 
management procedures must have been overlooked since their enforcement would have 
brought rating agencies or others to provide the required information. 
The second part of this text provides a discussion on these two issues. Calomiris (2008) 
introduces the literature on financial crises and sorts out new factors about the current crisis 
from traditional ones. Turning to concerns with ratings, the investors‟ complacency is put 
forward as a striking feature and the critical role of the principal-agent relationship between 
asset managers and final investors is pointed out. Similarly, introducing a theoretical view 
about the dynamics of market finance allows us to outline the central role that investment 
banking played in the previous speculative episode and to provide ground for this intuitive 
argument. This indeed relates to the now somewhat traditional view that market discipline will 
break up during euphoric times (see (Minsky (1975, 1982) and Kindelberger (1978)). Such a 
view  does  explain  why  rating  firms  ended  up  not  doing  that  a  good  job  at  providing 
information (i). One should however not forget the role of rating users (ii). Hence, the case 
against  rating  firms  evolves  into  a  case  for  an  informed  use  of  ratings.  As  critical  as 
incentives of asset managers may have proved, such a goal goes well beyond the issue. 
Strategies that could help dealing with this challenging task are then discussed.    4 
1. Rating Agencies and Structured Products Evaluation  
Although carefully defined as « opinions » on the certainty of future payments, credit ratings 
have  by  and  by  become  widely  shared  measures  of  credit  risk.  Such  a  role  made  the 
involvement of rating firms critical for the rise of the structured finance boom: without ratings 
as standard evaluations, distributing and marketing the complex structured finance securities 
would have proved harder. Starting over the summer 2007, the fate of securities structured 
out of subprime mortgage credit pools forced rating firms to announce massive downgrades 
along  with  a  number  of  rating  methodology  changes.  The  imbrications  of  the  structured 
finance field then brought an unprecedented wave of self-correcting actions, which inevitably 
lead to a general reconsideration of the use of ratings as standard credit risk measures. 
Asking why this change in privately issued opinions came to matter that much then brings 
forward serious concerns about structured product valuations procedures. 
 
1.1 Rating Agencies and the “Subprime” Crisis 
Every unexpected rating downgrade can be considered as a rating failure, the importance of 
which comes from the severity of the downgrade and/or the suddenness of the downgrade. 
Ratings are however meant to be relative measures and then what matters is the overall 
rating system. While a bunch of rating failures are threats against rating firms‟ reputation, 
they cannot provide a definitive case against this system
1. 
Rating  firms  may  well  have  sent  warning  signals  about  the  American  housing  market 
dynamics  since  2006,  substantive  corrective  actions  came  with  2007.  The  graph  below 
provides a tentative overview of the wave of downgrades that occurred. Every change in 
United States structured finance ratings documented by Bloomberg has been tracked over 
the past 4 years. Excluding short term ratings and outlooks/watch announcements allows a 
focus on long term ratings migrations. For each year, a panel of graph 1 plots the average 
move per broad rating categories and per broad structured finance field. These averaged 
figures are not stability scores since no information is given on all the ratings that kept the 
same. What can be read is the average move in number of notches provided that a rating 
had to be changed either by S&P, by Moody’s or by Fitch. This shed light on the severity of 
corrective actions consented by the three global leaders of the rating business. 
From 2005 to 2008 and for every broad structured finance field, legend tags give the annual 
number of long term rating actions (i-e downgrades and upgrades). The increase in these 
actions is impressive, especially since the 2008 graph merely deals with 8 months. Note that 
by  no  means  was  the  ABS  housing  field  especially  worrisome  up  to  2006.  Securities 
structured out of subprime RMBS are usually included in this field and by then the number of 
actions grew exponentially over 2007 and 2008. 
Indeed, the situation became critical over the summer 2007. Subprime RMBS downgrades 
were announced around a number of key dates and along with rating methodology changes 
(See AMF (2007, Table 2 p.16 and Annex 1 p. 27)). As the “wave” of corrections grew in 
size,  it became clear that  it would not spare  Collateral Debt Obligations  (CDO), a broad 
name for a variety of structured products best defined by their relative freedom of investment 
strategy (as opposed to ABS or MBS which must remain braindead structures). Over recent 
years, this particular type of investor had become a massive buyer of high yield securities 
structured out of subprime pools. Hence, credit default swap on tranches of CDO had risen 
as early as July 2007. However, a substantial number of negative actions on CDO ratings did 
not come before Fall 2007 (see, e. g., AMF (2007, inset 4 p.17)). Therefore, as can be seen 
                                            
1  Consider  the  major  public  outcries  following  Enron  or  Parmalat  cases.  The  usual  blame  game  could  not  lead  to  a 
straightforward case, as shown by American regulators. Rating agencies were quickly excluded from post-Enron proceedings 
because they were considered as external third-parties relying on biased accounting documents. American regulators were 
however not that keen on letting credit rating agencies not liable for this event. An independent process of hearings on the role 
and status of rating agencies was launched, out which came the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act.   5 
below, the overall change that had occurred in CDO ratings remained positive in 2007; this 




From the end of 2007 to the first half of 2008, a crucial issue became the fate of monoline 
insurers (also known as financial guarantors). Born in the 1970s, these institutions were left 
in charge of the activity of insuring bond payments by an American insurance regulation of 
1989.  Hence  their  name:  they  are  dedicated to  one  type  of  insurance.  Traditionally,  this 
service was predominantly purchased by American states and municipalities.  This meant 
insuring  the  payments  from  bond  issues  with  relatively  low  level  of  defaults.  Provided 
relevant capital structures, monolines insurers were then considered as extremely sound and 
given the highest grade possible by major rating agencies. Retrospectively, it seems that 
these  institutions  have  been  lured  by  the  consistent  lack  of  default  of  structured finance 
securities over the past 15 years. In any case, they ended up massively providing financial 
guaranties to tranches of structured products. For example, when the desired level of credit 
enhancement was not gained by tranching or over-collateralisation, the tranche would be 
“wrapped  up”  thanks  to  the  service  of  a  financial  guarantor;  in  the  case  of  a  CDO,  the 
financial guarantor could end up writing credit default swaps on senior notes or tranches and 
even  taking  up  the  management  (monolines  were  also  known  to  provide  various  credit 
enhancements to ABCP programmes, see (BIS (2005, box 5 pp.28-29)). From 2002 to 2006, 
2003 was the only year where structured finance securities were less than half of the new 
insurance writings for the whole industry (see AFGI (2007)). This resulted in the following 
distribution of financial guarantees at the end of 2006: 
Graph 1 – Number and Severity* of U.S. Structured Finance Rating Changes 
Source: Bloomberg; *: annual average of long term rating migrations announced by Fitch, Moody’s or S&P   6 
 
Source: AFGI (2007) 
*: Including Interest, Total = 3, 259, 189 Million USD 
 
Some  have  argued  that  major  rating  firms  have  had  an  active  role  in  leading  monoline 
insurers into structured finance activities… in any case, they were setting the final collateral 
levels that paid attention to the various enhancements provided by these institutions: they 
were the one evaluating how relevant were financial guaranties to structured products. As 
difficulties emerged from subprime RMBS to  CDO, the question was: to what extent  will 
suffer the financial soundness of these financial guarantors largely involved in structured 
finance? With reporting figures for the third quarter of 2007 came plunging stock market 
capitalizations and the question became: can rating agencies truly keep from downgrading 
their ratings of monolines? 
The answer was critical for two reasons: 1/ a rating at the highest grade possible was at the 
heart of the financial guarantor business, any downgrade would further impair their ability to 
cope  with  their  current  difficulties;  2/  any  downgrade  of  one  financial  guarantor  would 
automatically  imply  the  downgrade  of  all  securities  that  had  benefited  from  its  services. 
Actions began on 12/19/2007 with S&P downgrading ACA from A to CCC; since the starting 
note  was  not  among  the  highest  grades,  impacts  were  limited  to  collateral  calls.  Over 
January 2008, Fitch removed Ambac, SCA and FGIC from the AAA category. As a result 
around  290,000  insured  issues  had  to  experience  a  downgrade,  most  of  them  being 
municipal  bond  issues.  Difficulties  originated  in  structured  finance  were  now  gaining  the 
financing  costs  of  American  local  authorities.  More  downgrades  followed  over  the  first 
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Coming back to graph 1, the downgrades of monoline insurers are the key factor driving the 
impressive figures for 2008. 
With so wide impacts at stake, a number of “rescue plans” have been considered. As early 
as November 2007, CFIG had raised 1.5 Million USD from two banks. By January 2008, the 
New York State Insurance Regulator E. Dinallo was calling for industry efforts and spent the 
first semester of 2008 trying to orchestrate such private initiatives. Recapitalizations still have 
to prove their relevance since the loss of the top rating grades has impaired the ability to 
write new business. Anyhow, a major feature is that all initiatives have been mainly judged 
on how major rating agencies reacted, a point that may be interpreted as a wide acceptance 
of their status of monoline insurance “shadow regulators”. Moreover, with the shutting down 
of structured finance issuance over the end of 2007, the remaining potential customers are 
the American local authorities. W. Buffett seized the opportunity of creating a new monoline 
structure focused on municipal issues (Berkshire Hathaway Assurance Corp.). The coming of 
this top rated new entrant is another issue for existing players: their access to the municipal 
bond  insurance  business  has  been  sidestepped  while  they  have  to  struggle  with  their 
structured finance exposures.  
Such a bet may however seem hazardous considering how American local authorities have 
reacted to difficulties with financial guarantors. At the beginning of 2008, the fate of monoline 
insurers impose changes in State and Municipalities financing costs but whether and how 
rating agencies would act was still uncertain. This promised overall reconsideration has then 
been overcast by market disruptions impacting short-term borrowings. From 5 Billion USD in 
1998, Auction Rates Securities (ARS) issuance by US local authorities had reached 10 billion 
in 2000 and remained above 30 billion a year from 2002 to 20072. As a result, Municipals 
amounted to half of the ARS outstanding at the end of 2007 (see Analysis Group (2008, fig. 2 
p. 3) and SIFMA (2008, p. 16)). Over the first quarter of 2008, problems with ARS brought 
liquidity pressures to sub-sovereign issuers. The very choice of this dubious device for short-
term  financing  needs  could  be  seen  as  constrained  by  years  of  abusively conservative 
financing terms… by the beginning of March 2008, California State Treasurer B. Lockyer had 
launched a lobbying process along with 16 local authorities mainly claiming that municipal 
issuers had faced unfair financing costs because of a systematic downward bias in their 
ratings. By the end of March, Moody‟s had sent a request for comments on “a plan to assign 
global scale ratings to any municipal bond issue”; Fitch launched a similar process at the end 
of July. In September, Moody‟s announced that it would unify its rating scale from October 
2008 to January 2009. Meanwhile, on June 19th, a bill “to ensure uniform and accurate credit 
rating of municipal bonds and provide for a review of the municipal bond insurance industry” 
had been introduced to the U. S. Congress; in late July the Committee on Financial Services 
agreed  to  support  its  enactment  (see  U.S.  Congress  (2008a)).  Further,  on  July  30th, 
                                            
2 Auction Rate Securities (ARS) are long-term debt instruments whose interest or dividend rates are reset periodically through a 
Dutch auction, usually every 7, 28 or 35 days. ARS are often based on municipal bonds whose maturity can extend to 25 or 30 
years; they can also be based on “perpetual” preferred stock. Although ARS are issued and rated as long-term securities, they 
are priced and traded as short-term instruments. This alchemy works thanks to the auction based interest rate reset mechanism, 
which requires liquidity over the life of the underlying asset and whose success has traditionally been supported by broker 
dealers. Their role that could be seen as misleading (in 1995, the SEC fined Lehman Brothers USD 850,000 for manipulating 
auctions following the very first ARS issued in 1984 by American Express;  in 2006, it announced a Cease &Desist order on 
several practices by 15 broker dealers along with penalties of 13 Million USD). If one auction fails, the long term borrower must 
compensate “locked-in” holders with a penalty rate defined by contract. This rate can be set as high as 20 percent or be based 
upon money-market benchmarks. This rate will hold until other buyers support future auctions or until the borrower manages a 
call for conversion. Starting in the summer of 2007, volatility and spread widening resulted in supply-demand imbalances that 
brought 31 failed auctions over the last semester of 2007 (as compared to 13 since 1984). As imbalances proved structural, 
weakened broker dealers became reluctant to sustain auctions. A further 32 auctions failed in a two week period in January 
2008 and the ARS market froze with massive auctions failures from February to May 2008. The SEC, the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority, New York Attorney General A. Cuomo and twelve other State securities regulators launched industry wide 
investigations, which brought a number of lawsuits where banks were accused of failures to comply with the 2006 SEC order 
and of fraudulent sales misrepresenting ARS as liquid “cash-like” instruments. By the end of the summer 2008, many had 
chosen to settle out of court and to launch ARS buy back programs.   8 
Connecticut  Attorney General R. Bluementhal sued  Moody‟s, S&P and Fitch for “illegally 
giving Municipalities lower ratings, costing taxpayers millions”.  
With these evolutions in mind, the demand for monoline insurance seems bound to fade out 
and every downgrade of any of these firms will bring yet another wave of rating downgrades. 
Meanwhile,  the  status  of  ratings  as  widely  accepted  measures  of  credit  risk  has  been 
questioned like never before. However, as shown by the next section, their use had always 
been  known  to  be  limited  for  any  informed  structured  credit  valuation.  In  many  cases, 
questions and critics revealed how ratings were wrongly accepted at face value. 
 
1.2 Ratings and structured product risk  
A portfolio manager has to establish risk boundaries or to compute a Value at Risk (VaR). 
The standard model used in pricing, risk management or regulatory capital ratio is derived 
from option theory (see Finger (1999), McGuinty &Ahluwalia (2004) and Gordy (2003)). In 
the  case  of  structured  products,  the  portfolio  manager  shall  then  consider  tranches  as 
options  driven  by  the  underlying  portfolio  default  rate.  In  order  to  compute  a  VaR,  two 
elements  are  further  required:  Delta,  which  measures  the  underlying  portfolio  risk,  and 
Volatility, which measures the sensitivity to events affecting the underlying portfolio. Delta 
can be thought of as leverage: an equivalent position is expressed in terms of underlying 
quantity. Computed as the product price first order derivative to the underlying pool loss 
distribution, this position will be modified by any default or any change in default probabilities. 
This means that Delta becomes spurious unless updated frequently and that there is no true 
risk analysis without a focus on the key element of the underlying pool loss distribution. 
Taking the example of a CDO, Gibson (2004) shows that risk is concentrated in the more 
subordinated tranches. The following lines build on such a result to illustrate the core issues 
of structured product risk  analysis. As stated above, standard techniques build on option 
theory, which states that a firm or a structured entity is in default when it becomes insolvent. 
Consider the return on the assets from a company i as follows: 
 
     where,    εi : normally distributed “specific” factor 
                                   X : “systematic” factor 
                     ρ :  correlation to systematic factor  
 
By  hypothesis,  default  occurs  with  insolvability,  which  occurs  when  the  value  of  assets 
becomes inferior to the one of its liabilities: 
 
     where, Bi : distance to default expressed in returns 
 
 
Bi is inferred from statistical tables, which associate rating categories with observed default 
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Given  an  estimation  of  default  probability,  the  loss  distribution  of  the  underlying  pool  is 
computed with the help of Monte Carlo simulations. This means randomly playing thousands 
of scenarios of the random factor X and then summing the losses for every scenario. 
 



















i  9 
Once  the  loss  distribution  has  been  computed,  tranche  ratings  are  gained  by  fixing  the 
required  subordination  level.  This  means  defining  an  “attachment  point”  so  that  the 
associated  default  rate  probability  equals  the  historical  value  derived  from  the  corporate 
matrix transition. For example, suppose that such a matrix links an A rating to a 3% default 
rate, then the cumulative probability default rate that satisfies 3% in the loss distribution must 












Blindly trusting ratings issued from this methodology may become hazardous since default 
rates can be very volatile. Moreover, there is no certainty that default losses on structured 
portfolios will keep around the mean observed in statistics tables. Following difficulties with 
subprime mortgages originated in the United States between 2004 and 2006, attachment 
points  of  CDO  have  been  proven  under-estimated.  Credit  risk  models‟  parameters  have 
clearly not been conservative enough.  
Take the case of subprime portfolios. Correlations have been valued substantially less than 
100%  when  these  credits  eventually  all  depend  on  only  one  factor:  real  estate  prices. 
Geographical diversification has been overvalued and when the real estate prices started to 
decrease  over  the  whole  American  territory,  subprime  mortgages  became  massively 
insolvent: default rates rose to unprecedented levels. This lack of concern for an overall and 
massive drop in real estate prices came from a relative short memory of the real estate 
market. Such a lack of historical insight is a sign of a pervading underestimation of default 
rates: ABS default frequencies tables were built on a period exempt from a major downturn 
of the real estate market. 
To apprehend the influences of correlations and default rates, loss distributions of a portfolio 
including 1000 homogenous credits can be built. The following chart shows that an increase 
in correlations widens the tail of the curve. Overall the distribution converges to a bimodal 
form and this means that under strong correlations, only one default leads the portfolio to 
default  entirely.  This  is  why  an  equity  investor  has  long  correlations  position  whereas  a 
senior investor has a short correlations position, i.e. he sells protection against correlations. 
 
Loss distribution for a given correlation 












































































































Graph 3 - Loss Distribution and Tranching 
a=28%
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Graph 4 – Loss Distribution for a Given Correlation 
(firms’ default rate = 5%)   10 
A similar effect can be shown for an increase in the default rate by rating (graph 4). This is an 
increase in the unconditional probability: at a constant correlation level, an increase of all 
default rates in the pool means a higher default of the whole portfolio. 
 
Loss distribution for a given default rate 


















However  conservative  ratings  may  be,  they  are  simply  not  enough  from  a  portfolio 
management perspective. The investor has to know the underlying loss distribution and to be 
able to compute it so that risk exposure to the different factors of credit portfolio will be 
quantified. By computing the expected loss on the different tranches, graph 5 shows the risk 
leverage, defined as an equivalent exposure to the underlying portfolio. Given a 1% default 
rate, the sum of the tranches‟ expected losses is equal to the expected loss of the portfolio: 
1%. 
 



















For a 10% correlation, however, 80% of the expected loss portfolio is located in the equity 
tranche. For a 90% correlation, 75% of this loss is concentrated in the senior tranche. Going 
back to the case of 10% correlation and turning to table 1, the equity leverage of risk is 27.26 
(= (0.82% /1%) /3%). Given a risk perspective, this means that the equity position of 3 € is 
equivalent to a 27.26 € position in the portfolio. 
 
Table 1 - Tranche Risk Leverage Given a Correlation Level 
    Correlations 










0-3%  27,26  20,17  15,33  8,62  1,22 
3-6%  5,09  7,61  7,50  5,40  1,00 
6-9%  0,65  3,00  3,78  3,68  0,88 
9-12%  0,11  1,23  2,37  2,73  0,93 
12-22%  0,01  0,28  0,89  1,85  0,93 
22-100%  0,00  0,01  0,04  0,24  0,98 
 
Graph 5 – Loss Distribution for a Given Default Rate 
(default correlation = 10%) 
Graph 6 – Expected Losses for each Tranche    11 
With such leverage values, VaR levels can be very high for securitized tranches and they 
depend on correlation levels. Suppose a volatility of 10% for the underlying collateral. At a 
1% confidence level and given a 30% correlation, the VaR for the 3-6% tranche is -5.24 (= 
3*3.78*-2.33*10%). Table 2 below gives results for all the tranches. It can be seen that the 
VaR  for  subordinated  tranches  represents  all  the  position  invested.  This  is  one  of  the 
reasons why the Basel II framework is requiring 1 € of capital for every 1 € put in such a 
position. In the case of a 90% correlation, the VaR is 17.76 € for the 78 € senior tranche: the 
unexpected loss amounts to 23% of the position. 
 
Table 2 - Parametric VaR at a 1% Confidence Level 
    Correlations 









  0-3%  -19,03  -14,08  -10,70  -6,02  -0,85 
3-6%  -3,55  -5,31  -5,24  -3,77  -0,70 
6-9%  -0,45  -2,10  -2,64  -2,57  -0,62 
9-12%  -0,08  -0,86  -1,65  -1,90  -0,65 
12-22%  -0,03  -0,64  -2,06  -4,30  -2,16 
22-100%  0,00  -0,11  -0,74  -4,38  -17,76 
 
 
The  above  analysis  shows  the  importance  of  fully  implementing  an  internal  credit  risk 
models. Firstly, a critical view on the subordinations levels and on the final grades chosen by 
rating  organizations  is  mandatory.  Secondly,  CDO  exposures  and  leverage  should  be 
dynamically managed by following the evolutions of the pool characteristics. This requires a 
detailed knowledge of the underlying portfolios and this leads to point out two major issues:  
 
(i)  once  structured  products  were  issued,  rating  agencies  did  not  provide  the 
monitoring information that was critical for investors to use their rat ings in an 
informed manner 
 
(ii)  internal  risk  management  procedures  must  have  been  overlooked  since  their 
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2. Rating Agencies in a Speculative Episode 
This section provides a broad discussion on the two issues highlighted at the end of the 
previous section. Calomiris (2008) introduces the literature on financial crises and sorts out 
new factors about the 2007/2008 crisis from traditional ones. Turning to ratings, this analysis 
brings  forward  investors‟  complacency  as  a  striking  feature  about  the  current  crisis  and 
points out the critical role of the principal-agent relation between asset managers and final 
investors (see Calomiris (2008, pp.19-34)). In other words, with the end of the last section in 
mind, (ii) is the new feature while (i) is a quite traditional one. 
The fact that rating agencies did not do that a good job at providing relevant information can 
indeed be seen as an unsurprising feature. The crisis that erupted in August 2007 is in no 
departure  from  an  historical  pattern  highlighted  by  Kindelberger  (1978).  Market  finance 
brings endogenous financial cycles and a crisis bursts out because financial fragility builds 
up inconspicuously in the euphoric stage of a financial cycle (see (Minsky (1975, 1982)). 
During that stage, cushions of safety are being eroded progressively in the balance sheets of 
the  leading  financial  institutions  and  these  mounting  distortions  fail  to  raise  the 
consciousness of internal control systems, third party certifiers, and even the supervisors 
(see Kregel (2008)). If one faces the fact that financial fragility is inbuilt within market finance, 
it does not come as a surprise that excessive risk taking unfolds in a painful and long-lasting 
de-leveraging process once asset prices have turned down. With this in mind, (i) and more 
broadly the fact that rating firms did not help raise consciousness as risk was increasing is 
also unsurprising. The case against rating agencies is then introduced but one has to go 
beyond such a blame game and deal with the role of rating users (ii). 
 
2.1 Investment banking at the heart of market finance and leverage  
In  the  so-called  “subprime”  crisis  a  powerful  procyclical  dynamic  was  engineered  by  the 
intimate interaction of a host of financial innovations and changes in accounting rules: mark-
to-market of a wide range of financial assets that has enhanced credit against collateral, 
widespread use of credit derivatives that has allowed the securitization of about any type of 
credit, internal models of credit risk control based upon the Value-at-Risk (VaR) principle that 
has immoderately propelled leveraged trading portfolios. Investment banks have captured 
the  opportunity  to  link  together  those  devices  in  order  to  generate  a new  “originate  and 
distribute” model of credit that has hugely amplified the euphoric stage of credit expansion 
and asset price appreciation in the real estate sector.  
Figure 1 exhibits the procyclical roundabout process of mark-to-market leverage that spurred 
the portfolio of securitized credit in the ascending stage of the real estate cycle. Financial 
market intermediaries finance the purchase of credits to be structured with market borrowing 
(repos and commercial paper issuance). They prod the surge of credit to households by a 
host of banks and unregulated credit brokers. The originators sell the credits to the arrangers 
of Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) for  a fee. The process can be replicated with any 
credit eligible to pooling and repackaging in Asset-Backed Securities (ABS). 
Feedback effects arise with asset price appreciation because higher asset valuation entails a 
larger capital in the marked-to-market trading portfolio of financial intermediaries for a given 
level of debt. The leverage ratio l = A (total assets) / E (equity) becomes suboptimal: l < l* 
(desired leverage). Indeed, investment banks were out of the reach of Basle required capital 
ratios.  They  avoided  at  the  utmost  that  capital  gains  sit  idle  on  their  balance  sheets. 
Furthermore  the  desired  leverage  is  a  decreasing  function  of  the  Value-at-Risk.  VaR  is 
determined in credit risk models as a decreasing function of the distance to default which is 















Volume of Credit 
and l* = 1 / VaR is increased. Hence a rise in asset price boosts the leverage of investment 
banks  and  other  market  intermediaries  compounding  the  shadow  banking  system  (see 
(Tobias & Shin, 2008)). Practically, the financial intermediaries can pledge a higher value in 




Higher leverage gives an enhanced capacity to securitize credit while boosting asset prices, 
which in turn brings more favourable market conditions. On the supply side of mortgage 
credit, the originators have an incentive to supply more credit to borrowers at a given interest 
rate, because individual borrowers have a higher mortgage value with the rise in asset price. 
On the demand side households are eager to borrow more at a given interest rate because 
their equity value has risen. Therefore the aggregate demand and supply of credit are both 
positive functions of the asset price. They move up together with the asset price and feeds 
on the rise of the latter (Figure 2). This is the essence of the euphoric stage of the financial 
































Path  of  credit 
expansion 
D1D1 and S1S1: demand and supply of credit for an asset price P1 
D2D2 and S2S2: demand and supply of credit for an asset price P2 > P1 
 
Figure 2 - Credit Demand and Supply Interaction 
Figure 1 - Asset Price and Market Intermediaries’ Leverage 
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2.2 Ratings vs perverse incentives and crumbling market discipline? 
Perverse incentives arose at  all links in the chain of risk transfer from the originators of 
credits to the ultimate investors of multi-layered securitized assets via a tortuous and opaque 
process. An army of intermediaries took their toll: arrangers, off-balance sheet structures, 
hedge funds, rating agencies, lawyers and financial advisors. At origination the incentive to 
undervalue credit risk and to maximize moral hazard stems from the very nature of a model 
whose  shortcomings  were  magnified  by  the  aggressive  behaviour  of  unsupervised  credit 
brokers (Table 3). 
Table 3 - Two Models of Credit Supply 
Originate and hold  Originate and distribute 
  The lender‟s profit is an increasing 
function of risk taken 
  The lender‟s profit is an increasing 
function of the volume of credits sold 
  Incentive to value the borrower‟s 
solvency 
  Incentive to make credit against the 
expected collateral value 
  Info asymmetry reduced by 
monitoring of the borrower along the 
life of the loan 
  Info asymmetry augmented by the 
weak incentive to consider the risk 
profile of the debtor 
  Supply of credit by commercial 
banks with a capacity to assess risk 
  Supply of credit by banks and non-
bank credit brokers 
  Prudential control : provisions for 
default and regulatory capital 
  No prudential control, no capital 
provision 
Limited leverage and moral hazard   Maximized leverage and moral hazard  
 
On top of a high volume and massive risk undervaluation that was strikingly demonstrated 
with  subprime  credits,  arrangers  and  rating  agencies  make  the  most  of  an  “incestuous” 
relationship to pool credits, offload the pools in leveraged off-balance sheet structures and 
tranch them into asset-backed securities. By contrasting what has been done with mortgage 
credits and what should be done according to the principles of well-managed securitization, 
one  can  figure  out  the  damage  inflicted  by  the  investment  bank-sponsored  model  of 
securitization (table 4). 
The central role of rating agencies in structured finance brought a number of critics that 
preceded  the  wave  of  self-correcting  actions  introduced  in  section  1  (for  example,  see 
Partnoy  (2005)  and  especially  Mason  &Rosner  (2007)).  With  the  coming  of  the  crisis, 
blaming rating agencies became a favoured sport among editorialists and politicians. The 
base line would usually remain around assuming that rating agencies were guilty for the way 
they  had  rated  structured  finance  securities.  By  the  end  of  July  2007,  some  Moody‟s‟ 
shareholders had already filed class action proceedings arguing that the way management 
had  let  structured  finance  ratings  be  done  was  a  major  business  failure  threatening 
shareholder‟s value; similar complaints have then been filed against the parent companies of 
the  two  other  major  rating  firms.  In  September  2007,  a  US  Congress  committee  held 
hearings on the role of rating agencies in subprime mortgage securitizations. The SEC was 
questioned on its implementation of the 2006 Credit Rating Agencies Reform Act while all 
participants  were  asked  on  the  necessity  of  further  regulatory  proceedings  (see  U.  S. 
Congress (2007)). In the “old” world, the European Commission asked the Committee of   15 
European Securities Regulators to extend its scheduled review of rating agencies‟ business 
codes to their role in structured finance (see CESR (2008)). 
 
Table 4 - Two Conceptualizations of Securitization 
Benefits of properly managed 
securitization 




Lower Financing costs 
More even risk dispersion 
 
Larger portfolio choices 
Interests conflicts and information loss 
Securitization for regulatory arbitrage 
Incentive  structure  favours  volume 
against quality of credit at origination 
Risk  packaged  in  unconsolidated  and 
unregulated  off-balance  sheet 
structures 
Proper management: 
Credit to be packaged, secured and 
standardized 
Liquidity  secured  by  secondary 
market  or  by  regulating  investment 
banks  
No  deterioration  of  credit  quality  at 
origination 
Ultimate holders of risk able to make 
independent assessment  and exert 
market discipline on intermediaries 
Massive flaws in risk valuation  
Ratings  are  highly  misleading  as 
assessment of risk 
Investors  deprived  of  information  and 




These rating « agencies » are companies making business out of credit risk assessments 
published  as  ratings.  Such  particular  business  activity  was  born  at  the  beginning  of  the 
twentieth century in the USA and then spread internationally particularly since the financial 
liberalization  of the  1980‟s.  It  can  be  performed following  two  different  business  models: 
either by having investors pay for getting access to these privately issued opinions or by 
having  issuers  pay  for  getting  their  security  rated.  Overall  the  global  rating  business  is 
however heavily dominated by three firms that earn most of their revenue by faring securities 
issuers (Moody’s, S&P and Fitch). Basic cases against rating agencies have then focused on 
greed.  Since  the  early  1970‟s,  the  three  market  leaders  have  chosen  to  be  paid  by  the 
issuers of the securities they rate and then any of their major failures would bring charges 
against their inherent conflict of interest. This recurrent concern found the most fertile ground 
in the structured finance field: the complexity of structured products issuance would have 
facilitated collusion between a limited number of investment banks structuring the pools of 
credits and the “big 3“ rating agencies giving the final structured products evaluations.  
Postulating  industry  wide  devious  profit  driven  practices  is  however  limited.  First  and 
foremost, the reputation of major rating agencies suffered on the wake of the 1929 crisis 
when they were all paid by investors at the time (see Harold (1938, chapter 6-10). Secondly,   16 
official  inquiries  have  overall  failed  to  provide  substantive  back-up  material  for  such  an 
accusation
3.  
Acknowledging this point leads to focus on incompetence.  Retrospectively, hypothesis on 
default and recovery rates were unrealistically low regarding two issues: 
-  Statistical tables were based on a  period that was characterized by a strong rise in 
real estate prices. In this context, many debtors remained solvent thanks to a growth 
in their house value. In other words, the absence of downturn of the real estate prices 
in  the  statistics  contributed  to   an  underestimation  of  default  rates.  This  strong 
dependence to real estate is also a matter of concern for recovery rates. In a 
plummeting market, loss given defaults are much higher than in a booming one 
(Calomiris (2008, pp. 19-23). 
-  The borrower quality  dropped sharply since 2005 because the underwriting credit 
standards were not applied anymore. The increase of NINJA credits (No Job, No 
Income, no Asset) in subprimes pools implied a rise of the average borrower default 
probability that was not taken into account in the statistics tables (Ellis, 2008). 
Turning to structured product valuation models as  at the end of section 1, correlation is the 
factor that apprehends the dependence of credit risk to real estate cycle. This one is also 
likely to have been underestimated and most notably in the subprime case. For example, in 
the S&P CDO evaluator model, the maximum fitted correlation for MBS credits was a mere 
30% (see S&P (2006)). Interest conflicts may have fuelled a failure to act against these bad 
hypotheses. Yet, again, there is no certainty that investor paid rating firms would definitively 
ensure  against  such  unfortunate  developments.  Note  that  the  SEC  does  not  consider 
investor paid rating firms as purely exempt from potential interest conflicts (see SEC (2008b, 
note 55 p.10)).  
Further, the previous part of this paper showed how investors failed to check on structured 
finance ratings. This leads to a key question: can rating organizations‟ lack of concern for a 
number of issues be truly isolated from a pervading market convention? From autocorrelation 
risk to “short memory” datasets and to legal or counterparty risks, can these mistakes be 
blamed solely on raters? For instance, the Cuomo “landmark” agreement on rating agencies 
did nothing else than securing loan level data communication between investment bankers, 
due diligence firms and rating agencies: the failure of raters to fully enforce loan level data 
communications could not be abstracted from what had been going on in the rest of the 
                                            
3 Over the summer of 2007, New York Attorney General A Cuomo launched an inquiry on Wall Street‟s role in the mortgage 
boom and subpoenaed banks that had been major underwriters of mortgage securities, the three major credit-rating companies 
and due diligence firms (mortgage consultants, which vetted the loans). Connecticut Attorney General R Blumenthal began a 
similar review in late August and cooperated with New York prosecutors. In June 2008, “unprecedented” reform through a 
settlement with the “big three” rating agencies was announced… but was not made public, applied only to RMBS, and included 
a provision ending the agreement after three years. The investigation had mainly evidenced how investment bankers had been 
able to “shop” for rating by getting free rating previews from major rating agencies and how this situation induced “not so privy 
on due diligence report” raters. The deal required that every rating preview be paid and disclosed and that no rating be provided 
without due diligence reports. 
From March to June 2008, the Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) joined their efforts into 
“Operation Malicious Mortgage”, a national inquiry on mortgage fraud schemes that resulted in 144 fraud cases with involved 
losses estimated at 1 Billion USD. The DoJ said "anyone" involved in fraudulent mortgage loans had been targeted, from estate 
agents and appraisers to underwriters, developers, lenders and lawyers, though a focus was made on conspiracy cases (in 
which parties sought to engage in fraud for profit). In addition to fraud directly related to individual mortgages, the DoJ also 
investigated cases of mortgage-related securities fraud. On June, 19th 2008, the New York Eastern District Attorney‟s Office 
announced an indictment against two senior managers of failed Bear Stearns hedge funds, alleging that they marketed a low 
risk strategy  while  by  March  2007  they  believed  these  funds  in  grave  condition  and  at  risk  of  collapse  and  hence made 
misrepresentations to stave off investor withdrawal (the funds collapsed in the summer of 2007, with investors losing about 1.4 
Billion USD). The FBI did not identify 19 large corporate companies also investigated in close collaboration with the SEC and 
the DoJ, but mentioned that the majority of these cases involved accounting fraud, insider trading and purposed failures to 
disclose securitized loans and derivatives proper evaluations. To our knowledge, none of the credit rating agencies has yet 
been indicted. 
In early July 2008, the SEC published a much awaited report following a year long in depth investigation of the leading rating 
agencies. While major sources of concerns were outlined, the material disclosed provided no true case for fraud or devious 
profit driven internal procedures (see SEC (2008c))   17 
origination chain (see, supra, note 5). Most importantly, this “optimistic” market convention 
reflected in passive regulators. A proof of this can be a Bank of International Settlements 
report welcoming the fact that rating agencies did not prove overly conservative in front of 
structured  finance  dynamism…  a  couple  of  pages  after  showing  how  difficulties  with 
manufactured housing ABS had brought a crisis in 2004 (see BIS (2005, 2 p. 24, 3-4 p. 27 
and appendix 5 p. 51)). To some extent, this report show how regulatory bodies failed to 
initiate reforms after such an episode that clearly evidenced unfortunate chains of events. 
More broadly, portraying rating organization as unaccountable standard setters for structured 
products can hardly fail to draw attention on an even more guilty passivity of US regulators 
(see Reiss (2006)). 
Focusing on incompetence can lead to a radical denunciation of structured finance ratings. A 
structured pool of mortgage loans is fixed and bound to credit risk; hence, endeavouring to 
provide an ex ante rating that would prove stable over years and even over economic cycles 
is a far more challenging task than grading an issuer like a corporate4. So challenging that 
structured finance ratings may be found fundamentally misleading (Mason &Rosner (2007, 
pp. 34-47))
5. Less vehemently, this explains why they were slow to move their grades in front 
of market developments and why they were too late in adjusting their methodologies against 
mortgage securitization dynamics.  Overall, structured finance was  a new field for rating 
organizations and it brought unprecedented fragility to the rating system. The self correcting 
actions introduced in section 1 confess how the consistency of this system suffered (across 
asset classes, geographical zones and time). Eventually, most of the mismanagements that 
brought rating firms there will be corrected either by the organizations themselves worried 
about restoring their reputation or by regulatory framework evolutions (see SEC (2008a) and 
EC(2008)). There is however no such certainty about more worrying questions. The second 
part  of  this  text  showed  that  responsible  investors  should  have  gone  beyond  ratings. 
Provided  that  investors  had  failed  to  perf orm  such  a  control,  regulators  sh ould  have 
attempted to orchestrate it. Last but not least, financial regulators were also using ratings in 
the first place in a number of their rules and this practice should have induced a monitoring of 
ratings consistency.  
Beyond tailored measures against mismanagements revealed by the 207 7/2008 crisis, how 
can an informed use of ratings be secured? One may argue that recent events prove that 
such a task has to be institutionalized. Then three comments can be made. First, w ere 
regulators  to  agree  on  the  creation  of  a  public  rating  agency,  t his  would  likely  be 
counterproductive since all agents would consider the evaluation as provided with a definitive 
seal of approval. Secondly and echoing interest conflicts arguments, this informed use could 
be fostered by a more developed use of investor paid ratings. Turning to the equity markets, 
distinguishing buy side from sell side has been most commented upon (for example, see 
(Goshen &Parchomovsky (2004)). Note that the 2006 Credit Rating Agency was above all 
meant  to  increase  competition:  it  created  a  transparent  and  straightforward  designation 
framework thanks to which ratings from new entrants would be treated as equal to the ones 
of the market leaders for regulatory purposes. To go one step beyond, any financial rule 
                                            
4  The  financial  structure  can  evolve  in  order  to  face  adversity  and  sustain  payments  against  downfalls. It  has  even  been 
theorized that the lack of reaction by rating firms would result in an implicit contract where management was left enough time to 
find a relevant strategy (see Boot et al. (2006)). 
5 As a matter of fact, such a critique has had such a success that maybe the most agreed upon regulatory measure has been 
the requirement to better differentiate structured finance ratings from the traditional ones (see PWG (2008, p.4), FSF (2008, 
IV.4p.34), BIS (2008, pp. 14-15), IOSCO (2008, p.16), SEC (2008a, p. 96), EC (2008a, article 14 p. 18)). More broadly, in early 
July 2008, a bill “to direct the SEC to establish both a process by which asset-backed instruments can be deemed eligible for 
NRSRO ratings and an initial list of such eligible asset-backed instruments” was introduced to the U. S. Congress (see U. S. 
Congress (2008b)).  
More episodically, in May 2008, doubts on rating agencies‟ competencies were reaffirmed by revelations about Moody‟s‟ internal 
procedures  aiming  at  checking  flaws  in  their  evaluation  of  highly  complex  securities  known  as  Constant  Proportion  Debt 
Obligations (CPDO). S&P also confessed such procedures in July 2008, although to a lesser extent.   18 
referring to ratings could state that each type of ratings should be used. That is any rule 
using rating would aim at fighting the current oligopoly structure of the rating industry. Thirdly, 
while the reunion of global securities regulators has focused on codifying business practices 
(see IOSCO (2008)), its implementation of international financial reporting standards could 
lead to the creation of a global database centralizing privately issued ratings (see (IOSCO 
(2007,  p.7)).  This  is  nothing  more than  pooling  and  archiving  information  that  is  already 
mostly publicly disclosed, yet this is critical. Not surprisingly the goal of democratizing the 
access to rating histories can be found in regulatory proposals on both sides of the Atlantic 
ocean (see SEC (2008a) proposing to require their disclosure on rating firms websites and 
EC (2008) proposing the creation of a central repository for ratings). A global public central 
database has the advantage of not necessarily involving disclosure of investor paid ratings 












When,  as  shown  in  section  1,  rating  agencies  massively  downgraded  asset-backed 
securities in early 2007, institutional investors simply stopped buying them. The leveraged 
structures  in  the  securitization  chain  were  overloaded  with  assets  that  were  no  longer 
sellable and plagued by fast-increasing default risk. By August 2007, the supposedly liquid 
Asset  Backed  Commercial  Paper  (ABCP)  market  was  deprived  of  any  realizable  market 
value. This triggered a general loss of confidence that closed a crucial source of financing at 
the heart of how market finance had come to play with leverage during the previous euphoric 
stage (section 2). Deleveraging started and is far from being completed in late 2008… it 
drives down the whole economy to standstill, baring an outright recession. The credit crunch 
in the financial system that goes with deleveraging was periodically worsened by rounds of 
liquidity  stringency  due  to  the  management  of  counterparty  risk.  The  leveraged  entities 
(conduits, special investment vehicles and hedge funds) were under intense pressure from 
their  prime  brokers  which  imposed  higher  haircuts  on  new  financing or  demanded  asset 
liquidation to redeem former borrowing. The inability of many structures to withstand the dire 
liquidity  conditions  forced  the  investment  banks  to  re-intermediate  the  entities  they  had 
created to deconsolidate the credit risk in the pools of assets. Subsequently, investment 
banks were loaded with unknown future losses and scarcity of capital. The suspicion about 
the  extent  and  the  repartition  of  losses  exacerbated  counterparty  risk  and  threatened  to 
freeze the interbank market. This is why the Federal Reserve and other central banks have 
had to find innovative ways to provide liquidity: extending the maturities of their emergency 
lending,  providing  emergency  facilities  to  financial  institutions  that  were  not  under  their 
supervisory power and buying high-risk assets.   19 
Unsurprisingly investment banks bore the brunt of the crisis… two of the biggest Wall Street 
institutions  went  under:  Bear  Stearns  and  Lehman  Brothers  (respectively  in  March  and 
September 2008). These episodes showed how fragile are the networks of counterparty risk 
when confidence has been wiped out and market liquidity is at a low  ebb and  does not 
recover despite extraordinary funding facilities provided by the Federal Reserve. Meanwhile, 
worsening credit risk conditions had contaminated the whole mortgage credit market. The 
two Government Sponsored Entities (GSE) that were supposed to regulate the market of 
mortgage credit came under fire in July 2008 because their capital was much too low to 
sustain the mounting losses on their huge portfolio of mortgage backed securitized credits 
and on the even greater amount of securities they have sold and guaranteed (respectively 1 
845  Billion  USD  and  3  555  Billion  USD).  Because  non-resident  investors,  mostly foreign 
central banks, hold nearly a trillion of the debt of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two GSE 
could not survive unscathed. In early September and using a shallow distinction to escape 
nationalization, these institutions were put under “conservatorship” by the Treasury. 
Along the outbreak of financial difficulties, rating firms have had their share of the blame 
game.  Focusing  on  the  role  of  these  private  firms  is  nothing  but  yet  another  case  of 
gatekeeper liability. The argument is that the very agents that were capable of checking the 
issuance of structured products should been held liable for the harm that the fate of these 
securities brought: intermediaries should have been able to prevent the crisis. Such a line of 
discussion  has  to  raise  the  next  question:  can  a  regulatory  goal  be  efficiently  enforced 
through  a  gatekeeper  strategy?  Kraakman  (1984)  shows  how  aiming  at  making  whistle-
blowers out of gatekeepers is a poor strategy: gatekeeper liability should be both restrained 
to major failures and targeted on a community of agents. The reforms adopted on the wake 
the 1929 crisis follow these points (Securities Exchange Act, section 11). There are high 
chances that the upcoming reforms will follow them as well. 
Equipping  investors  with  means  of  assessing  risk  and  establishing  an  effective  principal 
agent  relationship  with  market  intermediaries  is  a  sure  way  to  rebuild  a  better  financial 
system.  Section  1  showed  how  the  implementation  of  basic  structured  product  valuation 
techniques should have led to a better monitoring of structured product ratings. Here was a 
clue pointing to a relative passivity of long run investors in front of a financing model mainly 
devised  by  investment  banks  (section  2).  Some  have  made  sense  of  this  passivity  by 
focusing on the principal agent relation ship between asset managers and final investors 
(see  Calomiris  (2008)).  Considering  this  particular  asymmetry  and  others  (see  Aschraft 
&Schuerman (2008)), it has been argued here that the most interesting challenge is to aim at 
institutionalizing the monitoring of rating firms. Interesting strategies have been introduced at 
the end of section 2. Yet, of course, no institutional mechanism will do for the ones who 
forget the lessons of History: speculation will come back and, somehow, “let the devil take 
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